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This chapter reviews literature on the distributional effects of environmental and energy policy.  In
particular, many effects of such policy are likely regressive.  First, it raises the price of fossil-fuel-intensive
products, expenditures on which are a high fraction of low-income budgets.  Second, if abatement
technologies are capital-intensive, then any mandate to abate pollution may induce firms to use more
capital.  If demand for capital is raised relative to labor, then a lower relative wage may also hurt low-income
households.  Third, pollution permits handed out to firms bestow scarcity rents on well-off individuals
who own those firms.  Fourth, low-income individuals may place more value on food and shelter than
on incremental improvements in environmental quality.  If high-income individuals get the most benefit
of pollution abatement, then this effect is regressive as well.  Fifth, low-income renters miss out on
house price capitalization of air quality benefits.  Well-off landlords may reap those gains.  Sixth, transition
effects could well hurt the unemployed who are already at some disadvantage.  These six effects might
all hurt the poor more than the rich.  This paper discusses whether these fears are valid, and whether
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dfullert@illinois.edu  Public economics has well developed tools for analyzing the incidence and 
distributional effects of all personal taxes, payroll taxes, property taxes, and corporate 
income taxes.  Some of that literature looks at distributional effects of environmental or 
energy taxes used to help control pollution or energy consumption.  Yet most pollution 
policy does not involve taxation at all.  Instead, it employs permits or command and 
control (CAC) regulations such as technology standards, quotas, and other quantity 
constraints.  Existing studies are mostly about effects on economic efficiency.  This 
literature addresses questions such as: how to measure the costs of reducing pollution or 
energy use, how to measure benefits of that pollution abatement, what is the optimal 
amount of protection, and what is the most cost-effective way to achieve it. 
  Yet CAC environmental restrictions do impose costs, and an important question is 
who bears those costs.  Moreover, those restrictions provide benefits of environmental 
protection, and another important question is who gets those benefits.  Thus, full analysis 
of environmental policy could address all the same questions as in the tax incidence 
literature.  Perhaps such analysis could use the same tools to address distributional effects 
– not of taxes, but of these other policies that are used to protect the environment. 
  This introduction discusses some initial literature on distributional effects of 
environmental and energy policy. It uses the literature on tax incidence as a starting point, 
but then goes on to point out ways in which distributional effects of environmental policy 
are more interesting and difficult.  For example, standard tax incidence literature would 
point out general equilibrium implications of an excise tax: not only does it affect the 
relative price of the taxed commodity, and thus consumers according to how they use 
income (uses side), but it also impacts factors intensively used in the production of that 
commodity, and thus individuals according to the sources of their income (sources side).  
This literature is reviewed in Fullerton and Metcalf (2002).   
  Yet an environmental mandate can have those effects and more!  To identify the 
major effects around which this introduction is organized, consider a simple requirement 
that electric generating companies cut a particular pollutant to less than some maximum 
quota.  This type of mandate is a common policy choice, and it has at least the following 
six distributional effects. 
First, it raises the cost of production, so it may raise the equilibrium price of 
output and affect consumers according to spending on electricity (uses side).   
Second, it may reduce production, reduce returns in that industry, and place 
burdens on workers or investors (sources side).   
Third, a quota is likely to generate scarcity rents.  Take the simple case with fixed 
pollution per unit output, so the only "abatement technology" is to reduce output.  Then a 
restriction on the quantity of pollution is essentially a restriction on output.  Normally 
firms want to restrict output but are thwarted by antitrust policy.  Yet in this case, 
environmental policy requires firms to restrict output.  It allows firms to raise price, and 
so they make profits, or rents, from the artificial scarcity of production.  Just as tradable 
permit systems hand out valuable permits, the non-tradable quota also provides scarcity 
rents – to those given the restricted "rights" to pollute.  
Fourth, if it cleans up the air, this policy provides benefits that may accrue to 
some individuals more than others.  The "incidence" of these costs and benefits usually 
refer to their distribution across groups ranked from rich to poor, but analysts and policy-
makers may also be interested in the distribution of costs or benefits across groups 
defined by age, ethnicity, region, or between urban, rural, and suburban households.   
Fifth, regardless of a neighborhood's air quality improvement, many individuals 
could be greatly affected through capitalization effects, especially through land and house 
prices.  Suppose this pollution restriction improves air quality everywhere, but in some   -2-
locations more than others.  If the policy is permanent, then anybody who owns land in 
the most-improved locations experience capital gains that could equal the present value 
of all future willingness to pay for cleaner air in that neighborhood. Similar capitalization 
effects provide windfall gains and losses to those who own corporate stock: capital losses 
on stockholdings in the company that must pay more for environmental technology, and 
capital gains on stockholdings in companies that sell a substitute product. 
Capitalization effects are pernicious.  A large capital gain may be experienced by 
absentee landlords, because they can charge higher rents in future years.  Certain renters 
with cleaner air might be worse off, if their rent increases by more than their willingness 
to pay for that improvement.  Moreover, the gains may not even accrue to those who 
breathe the cleaner air!  If households move into the cleaner area after the policy change, 
then they must pay more for the privilege.  The entire capital gain goes to those who 
happen to own property at the time of the change, even if they sell it at the higher price 
and move out before the air improves.  Similarly, new stockholders in the burdened 
company may be "paying" for abatement technology in name only, with the entire present 
value of the burden felt by those who did own the stock at the time of enactment, even if 
they sell that stock before the policy is implemented. 
Sixth, strong distributional effects are felt during the transition.  If workers are 
laid off by the impacted firm, their burden is not just the lower wage they might have to 
accept at another firm.  It includes the very sharp pain of disruption, retraining, and 
months or years of unemployment between jobs.  These effects are analogous to 
capitalization effects, if the worker has large investment in particular skills – human 
capital that is specific to this industry.  If the industry shrinks, those workers suffer a 
significant loss in the value of that human capital.  They must also move their families, 
acquire new training, and start back at the bottom of the firm hierarchy, with significant 
psychological costs. 
Using these six categories in six sections below, this introduction covers research 
in economics that has begun to analyze distributional effects of environmental and energy 
policy.
1  Particular emphasis is given to the twenty-one papers published in economics 
journals that are reprinted in this book.  To set the stage for that discussion, however, the 
rest of this preliminary section reviews some earlier papers. 
The classic text in the economic analysis of environmental policy is the book by 
Baumol and Oates (1988), which devotes a whole chapter to distributional effects.  Since 
they nicely review the literature prior to 1988, this book emphasizes later literature and 
the current state of the art.  Yet that text effectively issues two challenges to subsequent 
researchers.  First, because research on distributional effects was not very extensive or 
well developed, the allocation of an entire chapter to it effectively challenges the field of 
environmental economics to deal with this topic more seriously.  This collection 
examines how well recent researchers have risen to the challenge. 
A second challenge in that chapter of Baumol and Oates (1988) is related to the 
idea that many effects of environmental policy are likely regressive.  Consider the six 
categories just listed.  First, it likely raises the price of products that intensively use fossil 
fuels, such as electricity and transportation.  Expenditures on these products make up a 
high fraction of low income budgets.  Second, if abatement technologies are capital-
intensive, then any mandate to abate pollution likely induces firms to use new capital as a 
substitute for polluting inputs.  If so, then capital is in more demand relative to labor, 
depressing the relative wage (which may also impact low-income households).  Third, 
                                                 
1 Another good review of recent literature on distributional effects of environmental policy is provided by 
Parry, Sigman, Walls, and Williams (2006).    -3-
pollution permits handed out to firms bestow scarcity rents on well-off individuals who 
own those firms.  Fourth, low-income individuals may place more value on food and 
shelter than on incremental improvements in environmental quality.  If high-income 
individuals get the most benefit of pollution abatement, then this effect is regressive as 
well.  Fifth, low-income renters miss out on house price capitalization of air quality 
benefits.  Well-off landlords may reap those gains.  Sixth, transition effects are hard to 
analyze, but could well impact the economy in ways that hurt the unemployed, those 
already at some disadvantage relative to the rest of us. 
That is a potentially incredible list of effects that might all hurt the poor more 
than the rich.  The second challenge for subsequent literature, then, is to determine 
whether these fears are valid, and whether anything can be done about them – other than 
to forego environmental improvements! 
Following this introduction is a paper by Fullerton (2001, Chapter 2 of this 
volume) which does not make an original research contribution in the usual sense.  
Rather, it is a synthesis and exposition of economic analyses to compare eight pollution 
control policies: taxes, subsidies, permits handed out to firms, permits auctioned by 
government, CAC performance standards, CAC technology mandates, and even Coase 
(1960) solutions where the "property rights" to pollute might be owned by the polluter or 
by victims.  It also shows which policies may equivalently affect each group.  For 
example, the pollution tax and auction of permits both capture scarcity rents for the 
government, whereas the simple pollution quota and the handout of permits both give 
those rents to firms.  The eight policy alternatives are compared on multiple grounds, 
including economic efficiency, administrative efficiency, political feasibility, 
enforceability, and distributional effects.  The paper is included here because of the 
simple exposition of who gains and who loses from each environmental policy.  A simple 
diagram shows the burden on consumers, the gains to the owners of the right to pollute, 
and the gains to those who value the environment.   
 
I. Costs to Consumers 
 
  To categorize the six distributional effects, consider the market for a polluting 
good (such as electricity).  In Figure 1, demand reflects private marginal benefits (PMB).  
Yet production has private marginal costs (PMC), and the pollution externality means 
that social marginal costs (SMC) include marginal environmental costs (MEC).
2 
  In this diagram, the private market with no policy restriction would produce to the 
point where PMB=PMC, namely output  Q
o.  The optimal output is where SMB=SMC, at 
reduced output  Q'.  A pollution quota would effectively restrict output to Q', and we can 
now categorize distributional effects.  This section deals with costs to consumers. 
This environmental policy raises the equilibrium output price to a new "gross" 
price, P
g, and it reduces consumer surplus by the trapezoid area A+D.  The amount of this 
price increase and resulting burden depend on various considerations that must be 
analyzed.  It is relatively large, as drawn, because the elasticity of demand for this output 
is low compared to the elasticity of supply.  If consumers can switch to good substitutes 
more easily, then demand is flatter, consumer burden is smaller, and the loss of producer 
surplus is larger.  Thus the economic analysis in each case must measure both demand 
and supply elasticities, and the fraction of each group's income spent on this good. 
                                                 
2 For simplicity, assume that pollution per unit of electricity is fixed.  Then the demand for electricity is the 
"demand for pollution", and the only way to cut pollution is to cut output.  The externality can be corrected 
by a tax on pollution, which is equivalent in this case to a tax on output.  It also can be corrected by a 
permit system.  The example in the text is a simple quota, or quantity constraint.   -4-
 
Figure 1: Categories of Gains and Losses 
 
The Clean Air Act is likely to raise the cost of electricity, gasoline, and other 
products that rely on fossil fuel.  Estimates suggest that such spending is a higher fraction 
of total spending for low-income than for high-income families, so early studies such as 
Gianessi et al (1979) find that costs of the Clean Air Act in the U.S. are regressive.
3  
Then, in other research, Robison (1985) assumes that all industrial pollution control costs 
are passed forward into output prices, and he uses a disaggregate input-output model to 
calculate the ultimate effects on all goods purchased by twenty different income groups.  
He finds that burdens are very regressive, ranging from 0.76 percent of income for the 
poorest group to 0.16 percent of income for the richest group. 
James Poterba (1991, Chapter 3 of this volume) looks at the gasoline tax, and he 
makes two points that both tend to offset that previous finding of regressivity.  First, early 
studies rank families from the lowest annual income to the highest annual income.  Yet 
annual income fluctuates, and it varies over the life-cycle.  The very young and old spend 
                                                 
3 Even if the amount spent on electricity is higher for a rich family than for a poor family, that electricity 
spending as a fraction of income is found to be lower for those with high income.  Thus the policy is 
"regressive", meaning that the burden as a fraction of income is lower for those with more income. The 
burden is "proportional" if the ratio of burden to income is the same across all income groups, and it is 
"progressive" if that burden ratio is higher for those with more income.     -5-
more than their annual income, because they know that annual income is temporarily 
low.  They are not "poor" in terms of permanent or lifetime income.  Poterba points out 
that annual total consumption expenditure is a good proxy for permanent or lifetime 
income, and so he ranks families from the lowest to the highest annual consumption.  
Then, because those with low annual income tend to consume more of their income than 
those with high annual income, any commodity tax appears to be more regressive on the 
basis of annual income.  Thus the change to annual consumption as a proxy for 
permanent income makes the gasoline tax less regressive. 
The second point about the gas tax is that the very poorest households cannot 
afford to own a car at all.  They take public transportation.  Thus, Poterba finds that the 
burden of a gas tax is the highest percent of "permanent income" for those in the middle 
of that spectrum.  It is not strictly regressive at all.  This point would not necessarily 
reduce the regressivity of other taxes on energy, however, if the poorest households do 
use a high fraction of total expenditures on heating fuel and electricity. 
Another two points are raised by Walls and Hanson (1999, Chapter 4 of this 
volume).  They also compare annual and lifetime income, but not using consumption as a 
proxy for lifetime income.  They start with 1,000 households from the 1990 National 
Personal Transportation Survey, which includes socioeconomic and demographic data as 
well as each household's vehicle make, model, and year.  Then, to construct lifetime 
income for each household, they use coefficients on household characteristics from the 
lifetime wage-age profiles estimated by Fullerton and Rogers (1993) using longitudinal 
data from the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics.  Second, instead of just looking at a gas 
tax, Walls and Hanson look at emission policies.  For each vehicle in the NPTS cross-
section, they assign an emissions rate (using remote-sensing emissions data on 90,000 
vehicles).  They then calculate the effect on each household of (1) the current system of 
annual registration fees based on car value, (2) basing annual fees on vehicle miles 
traveled (VMT) of that vehicle, (3) a fee based on the emission rate of the vehicle, or (4) 
on the estimated emissions of the vehicle (emissions per mile times miles).  
  Interestingly, the current fees based on car value are only somewhat regressive: 
low income families spend a high fraction of income on cars, but higher income groups 
buy higher-valued cars.  Yet those fees perversely charge less for the more-polluting cars 
(which have lower value).  The attempt to fix those incentives by placing more tax on the 
low-valued polluting cars undeniably makes the fee more regressive.  The VMT fee looks 
a lot like the gas tax discussed above.  The emissions fee is more regressive, because it is 
VMT times the emission rate, but the fee based on emissions rate is the most regressive.  
All such fees are less regressive when viewed in a lifetime perspective. 
  Contributions come in pairs in this section, including those of Metcalf (1999, 
Chapter 5 of this volume).  First, instead of looking only at gas or vehicle taxes, he 
considers a comprehensive environmental tax reform that includes a carbon tax, gas tax, 
air pollution taxes, and a virgin materials tax.  Together these would raise prices of 
various energy-related goods (and revenue equal to 10% of current federal receipts in the 
U.S.).  He then uses an input-output model to calculate the increase in price of every 
industry's output, and he calculates the effect of those price increases on a large sample of 
households from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX).  He shows that all of those 
environmental taxes are regressive when measured against annual income, to varying 
degrees, but each is less regressive when measured against lifetime income. 
  Second, however, he points out the importance of what is done with the revenue. 
If the package were revenue-neutral, the new environmental taxes could be used for a 
combination of: an exemption from payroll tax for the first $5,000 of wages, a $150 tax 
credit for each exemption in the personal income tax, plus an across-the-board income tax   -6-
cut of 4%.  This tax shift is still somewhat regressive when measured by annual income, 
but the overall package has no effect (or is slightly progressive) when measured by 
lifetime income.  The key point is that environmental tax reform does not need to be 
regressive; the revenue could be used in ways that are even more progressive than the 
payroll and income tax cuts assumed by Metcalf.   
  Sarah West (2004, Chapter 6 in this volume) studies gasoline taxes and car 
policies related to emissions, as do those reviewed above, but she makes two additional 
points.  First, consumers have preferences over VMT, rather than gasoline per se, and so 
utility-based welfare measures are best calculated from VMT demand.  Yet the price of 
driving a mile is endogenous.  It depends on miles per gallon, which depends on the 
choice of vehicle, which depends on the price of gasoline and on all of the household's 
unobserved characteristics.  Since the price of a mile is endogenous, a regression of VMT 
demand on VMT-price would yield biased coefficients.  She corrects for this bias by first 
estimating discrete demand for vehicle type and then using those results in the estimation 
of continuous demand for VMT.   This correction is important, and most good subsequent 
studies of car and gas demand have undertaken similar corrections. 
  Her second major point is that groups have different price responsiveness.  She 
uses total consumption to classify households from poor to rich (as a proxy for permanent 
income), and she estimates VMT demand for each decile separately.  She finds that 
poorer groups are more price-responsive, which reduces their gas tax burden.  In Figure 1 
above, their demand would be flatter, and so the same increase in price (from  P
o  to  P
g) 
would reduce quantity more (from  Q
o  to  Q'). It would thus shrink their loss in consumer 
surplus (area A+D).  This effect reduces the regressivity of the gas tax.
4  
  The last paper included in this section is by West and Williams (2004, Chapter 7 
in this volume).   In their words, their "study makes two main contributions" (p. 536).
5  
First, they use an estimated demand system to calculate four different measures of 
"burden" for each group.  The simplest procedure used in early literature assumes no 
price responses, but they also calculate a consumer surplus measure assuming all groups 
have the same price response, a consumer surplus measure using each group's own price 
response, and an additional measure based on the equivalent variation for each group.  
The first of those makes the gas tax look most regressive.  As in West (2004), the use of 
each group's own response makes the gas tax look least regressive.  The second point of 
West and Williams is to calculate incidence for three different assumptions about use of 
the revenue.  The gas tax is most regressive with no return of revenue, it is less regressive 
when revenue is used to reduce wage taxes, and the whole reform becomes progressive 
when revenue is used to provide the same lump-sum rebate to each household.  This last 
result highlights the tradeoff between equity and efficiency, since the uniform lump-sum 
rebate cannot reduce income tax distortions by cutting taxes on work effort. 
 
II. Costs to Producers or Factors 
 
  Energy or environmental policy may also impose burdens on producers or on 
factors of production.  Figure 1 shows a simple partial equilibrium model, where the loss 
                                                 
4 Many of the poorest households don't own cars or buy gas, so the gas tax is somewhat progressive over 
the first few deciles and then regressive over remaining deciles.  The fact that the price elasticity falls with 
income means that the gas tax is even more progressive over the first few deciles and less regressive 
beyond that.  West also calculates the incidence of a subsidy to newer cars; it may encourage the purchase 
of newer cars with lower emission rates, but it is a decidedly regressive policy. 
5 Like other papers discussed above, it really makes more than two contributions.  Unfortunately, however, 
space constraints here preclude more than about two points from each paper included in this volume.   -7-
in producer surplus (area B+E) is relatively small because the supply curve (PMC) is 
relatively elastic.  These losses could be larger if instead production involves industry-
specific resources in relatively fixed supply, such as a specific type of energy, land with 
specific characteristics, or labor with industry-specific skills.  If so, then the cut-back in 
production burdens the owners of those limited resources. 
  A general equilibrium model could be used to solve for the new economy-wide 
wage, rate of return, or land rents, and a more sophisticated dynamic general equilibrium 
model could be used to solve for short run effects, capital deepening, and the transition to 
a new balanced growth path with a new labor/capital ratio. 
  The early development of this literature is exemplified by the dynamic growth 
model of John and Pecchenio (1994, Chapter 8 in this volume).  In this model, production 
uses labor, physical capital, and natural environmental capital.  Each agent's earnings 
when young are allocated between savings for consumption when old, or for maintenance 
of the environment.  That choice takes into account that environmental maintenance can 
increase welfare when old, but it does not take into account the welfare of unborn 
generations.  Thus the framework is useful for studying a particular kind of distributional 
effect – between generations.  As in other natural resource models, this economy can 
have multiple equilibria: one with low environmental maintenance that leads to low 
production and low investment, and the other with high physical capital and good 
environmental quality.  This insight also helps explain some observed distributional 
differences between rich and poor countries, even poor countries that start with abundant 
resources.  The paper also describes alternative transition paths: one with growing capital 
and degrading environment, one with both capital stocks shrinking, and one with both 
growing.  It also points to the importance of environmental accounting, since rising 
income does not necessarily mean rising welfare for future generations. 
  A different kind of general equilibrium model is in Fullerton and Heutel (2007a, 
Chapter 9 in this volume).  It is not a growth model, since labor and capital are both in 
fixed supply, but it can be used to solve analytically for the effect of an energy tax on 
multiple output prices and factor prices – including the wage for labor and the return to 
capital.  The "clean" sector uses only labor and capital, but the "dirty" sector uses labor, 
capital, and pollution.  With three inputs, any two can be complements or substitutes.  
First, the "substitution effect" places less burden on whichever factor is a better substitute 
for pollution (and more burden on the other one).  Second, because the pollution tax 
raises output price and reduces production, the "output effect" is likely to place more 
burden on whichever factor is intensively used in the dirty sector.
6   
They then look at special cases.  Even if both factors are equal substitutes for 
pollution, the intensively-used one does not always bear more burden.  If the dirty sector 
is capital intensive, for example, then the output effect would tend to place more burden 
on capital, depending on consumers' ability to substitute between the two outputs.  But if 
that effect is relatively small, it can be more than offset by the fact that the dirty sector is 
trying to substitute out of pollution and into both capital and labor at its current 
capital/labor ratio, which means less burden on capital.  Finally, these authors employ 
stylized facts and plausible parameter values to conclude that "the impact of factor 
intensities over the plausible range is less important than the impact of the elasticities of 
substitution between pollution and capital or labor" (p.587).  In other words, to know who 
bears the burden of energy policy, it is important to estimate cross-price elasticities. 
                                                 
6 In this model, environmental quality is separable in utility.  In a more complicated model, the increase in 
environmental quality itself could affect the relative demands for goods and thus returns to factors.    -8-
In a working paper, Fullerton and Heutel (2007b) note that most environmental 
policies do not use taxes.  Instead, regulators have employed CAC restrictions on the 
quantity of pollution (a "quota"), on pollution per unit output (a "performance standard"), 
or on pollution per unit of some input (a "technology mandate").  They find the same 
effects as before but identify other new effects as well.  The restriction on the ratio of 
pollution to output can be achieved both by reducing pollution in the numerator and 
increasing output in the denominator.  Thus, it involves an implicit "output subsidy".  
Under plausible conditions, this effect can help any factor that is intensively used in the 
polluting sector. 
In other words, actual policies can be tricky.  With multiple offsetting effects on 
the wage rate and return to capital, we cannot just assume that a restriction on the 
polluting sector will injure whatever factor is intensively employed there. 
 
III. Benefits via Scarcity Rents 
 
  When the quantity of the polluting good is restricted in Figure 1, the restriction 
makes the good scarce and gives rise to scarcity rents (area A+B).  If the policy is a tax 
on pollution or the auction of permits, then the government captures those scarcity rents 
as revenue.  If the policy is a handout of permits or a quantity restriction (quota), then 
area A+B becomes profits to the firms that are allowed to produce and sell that newly-
restricted quantity.  That simple theory may be obvious in the case of Figure 1, where 
pollution is a fixed ratio to output, because then a restriction on pollution also restricts the 
quantity of output.  But what if firms can abate pollution per unit of output?  What if the 
policy requires a particular technology, and entry is permitted? 
  Maloney and McCormick (1982, Chapter 10 in this volume) show how scarcity 
rents can still be generated in these circumstances, and they provide empirical evidence 
for two different regulations, using data on stock market returns around the time the new 
regulation is imposed.  First, in 1974, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
imposed new cotton-dust technology standards uniformly on all textile firms.
7  Looking 
at a portfolio of 14 textile stocks, they find a significantly positive abnormal return 
around the time this rule is imposed.  This result is not sensitive to various alterations of 
the model and time period, and it is not explained by other events at the time. 
In addition, many rules do effectively restrict entry by imposing stricter regulation 
on new firms only, while "grandfathering" existing firms.  Maloney and McCormick also 
look at the 1973 decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in favor of environmental groups 
that sued the EPA to "prevent significant deterioration" of air quality in areas already in 
compliance with National Ambient Air Quality Standards.  Because this decision could 
not be fully anticipated, it represents a good "event" to study.  Only new entrants are 
forced to meet stricter standards, especially those who emit sulfur oxides and particulates.  
These emissions are concentrated in nonferrous ore smelting, so they look at stock prices 
of existing copper, lead, and zinc smelters.  Again they find significant positive abnormal 
returns to existing firms in those industries. 
One might think that producers would abhor costly new regulations, in a political 
battle between polluters and environmentalists, but this evidence suggests that "the 
interests of environmentalists and producers may coincide against the welfare of 
                                                 
7 If marginal and average costs were perfectly flat and identical for all firms, and if this regulation shifted 
costs up by the same amount for all firms, then none would make profits.  But if a fixed number of 
competitive firms have U-shaped average cost curves, then a new technology standard may increase 
marginal costs more than average costs.  If so, the new intersection of demand and marginal cost 
determines a price that is above average cost, generating profits.     -9-
consumers" (pp. 99-100).  The implications are important not only for the political 
economy of enacting environmental legislation, but for the distributional impact as well: 
environmental policies impose abatement costs that must be borne by producers and 
consumers, but also can provide significant benefits to others by generating profits.  
The U.S. is now contemplating a policy to limit carbon emissions that contribute 
to global warming, and such a policy might have huge effects both because fossil fuel is 
such a large input to production and because the policy might require large reductions.  
Dinan and Rogers (2002, Chapter 11 of this volume) find that restricting emissions by 
just 15%, relative to business as usual, would raise prices by 2.8%.  If this policy were a 
carbon tax, it might raise $128 billion (in 1998 levels and dollars).  More likely, however, 
U.S. policy would hand out tradable permits and $128 billion of private profits for firms.  
Thus they find that "the magnitude of the wealth that would be redistributed … could 
substantially exceed the actual cost to the economy" (p.200).
8 
Dinan and Rogers use results from the input-output model of Metcalf (1999) on 
the carbon content and price increase for each commodity, and they use a large sample of 
57,247 households from the Current Population Survey matched with tax return data 
from the Statistics of Income and consumption data from the CEX.  They also account for 
a few intricacies: first, the permit policy would exacerbate deadweight losses from taxes 
that have their own distributional effect; second, the corporate tax would capture for 
government some of the profits; third, the policy decision about use of that revenue 
would have its own distributional effects; fourth, the higher output prices would trigger 
increases in indexed transfer programs like Social Security, with further distributional 
effects.  With all of these intricacies, the predominant effects are still (1) low-income 
households spend more of their income on carbon-intensive products, and (2) high-
income households own the corporations that receive profits.  Thus, the policy is overall 
highly regressive unless government captures a higher fraction of the scarcity rents and 
uses that money to provide an equal lump sum amount to every individual.  
  Parry (2004, Chapter 12 of this volume) addresses some of the same questions, 
but uses a more stylized analytical model with less detailed calculations but with explicit 
formulas that show impacts of underlying parameters.  He also looks at other pollutants 
(SO2 and NOX) and other policies (performance standards, technology mandates, and 
taxes on dirty inputs).  He finds that grandfathered permits benefit stockholders and thus 
can provide gains to high-income groups while imposing large costs on the poor. This 
effect is diminished with more substantial requirements for abatement.  The burden on 
low-income groups can be reduced by the other policies that do not provide windfall 
profits to stockholders.  When abatement costs differ between sources, then a permit 
system can minimize the overall costs of abatement, but that gain in economic efficiency 
can be offset by the social costs of adverse redistribution if the social welfare function 
exhibits aversion to income inequality.  In other words, social welfare might be raised 
more by inefficient CAC mandates than by grandfathered permits.  And the auction of 
permits achieves efficiency without that handout of profits to wealthy stockholders. 
  A rather contrary view is expressed in the next paper by Louis Kaplow (2004, 
Chapter 13 of this volume), who suggests that evaluation of the economic efficiency of 
such a reform need not account for adverse distributional effects at all!  If a gas tax or 
other pollution policy imposes costs on low-income groups and benefits to high income 
groups, those redistributive effects could be offset by adjustments to the income tax.  
                                                 
8 Theory suggests that U.S. firms could profit from the distribution of these carbon permits, but this theory 
is confirmed by evidence for the European Union's Emissions Trading System.  Sijm et al (2006) find that 
60 to 100% of the cost of CO2 permits are passed through to consumers in Germany and the Netherlands, 
even though power companies receive permits for free.  Firms thus realize substantial windfall profits.     -10-
Moreover, any policy's adverse distributional effects should not be attributed to the 
policy, but rather, to the failure to make those income tax adjustments.  The point is that 
we need not choose the less efficient environmental policy in order to avoid adverse 
distributional effects, since we could instead offset those effects through income tax 
adjustments.  His argument is more complicated and subtle than can be stated in this short 
introduction, which is a good reason to include the whole paper in this volume.
9  The 
interesting conceptual point is not that environmental policy can proceed regardless of 
measured effects on distribution.  Indeed, measures of distributional effects provided by 
the various papers in this book are important, in order to know how to adjust the income 
tax in a way that would neutralize these distributional effects. 
  Because quotas or grandfathering of permits provides benefits to firms as well as 
to environmentalists, it can create a powerful coalition that greatly increases the political 
feasibility of environmental protection.  Bovenberg, Goulder and Gurney (2005, chapter 
14 if this volume) investigate exactly what fraction of permits or rents must be allocated 
to firms to cover their losses, while other permits are sold at auction to achieve greater 
efficiency by cutting distortionary taxes.  They build analytical and numerical models 
with perfect competition, constant returns to scale, a clean good, an intermediate good, 
and a final good produced in a polluting process.  All three goods use labor and capital.  
If those inputs were perfectly mobile, then each industry would earn zero profits both 
before and after a pollution tax or auction of permits, so the simplest case implies that no 
permits need to be grandfathered to firms.  Yet Bovenberg et al recognize adjustment 
costs in the re-allocation of capital, so firms would indeed make losses upon imposition 
of a sector-specific policy.  For little abatement, they find that only about a quarter of 
permits must be handed out, but higher levels of required abatement increase that fraction 
– and the loss in efficiency from not cutting other taxes. 
 
IV. Benefits of Protection 
 
  A policy to abate pollution also provides benefits to those who breathe the air, 
those who drink the water, and those who enjoy recreation.  In Figure 1, these gains are 
represented by area C+D+E, the sum of "marginal environmental damages" over the 
range that pollution is reduced (from Q
o to Q').  Who are these individuals, and what 
socioeconomic groups receive most of these benefits?  These questions are related to who 
bears the cost of pollution (except that a proposal may not abate pollution proportionately 
everywhere).  A key question is whether polluters choose to locate disproportionately in 
poor or minority areas.  This is the question of "environmental justice." 
  As a representative of early attempts to address these questions, Brooks and Sethi 
(1997, Chapter 15 of this volume) employ much data from the 1988-1992 Toxic Release 
Inventory (TRI) in the United States, plus 1990 census data on race, ethnicity, poverty 
status, and educational attainment at the zip code level.  They improve upon prior papers 
by weighting different air emissions according to toxicity, and calculating for each zip 
code an exposure based on the distance to various pollution sources around it.  They 
regress this exposure on census variables and other controls to find that exposure is 
significantly and positively related to: the proportion of blacks in the community, the 
proportion who are renters, the percent poor, lower voter turnout, and lower educational 
attainment.  Most of the paper is careful to discuss the "relationship" between exposure 
and these socioeconomic variables, but some of it lapses into causal interpretations.  The 
                                                 
9 In particular, he assumes that leisure is separable in utility, whereas many other papers assume instead 
that the environment is separable in utility.   -11-
main problem is the endogeneity of all these variables: if high pollution reduces local 
land values and housing rents, and if low-income households have more need for basic 
necessities than for the "purchase" of clean air, then low rents may bring them into the 
area – reverse causality.  If so, then estimated coefficients are biased, and pollution does 
not impose disproportionate burdens on poor and minority households. 
  The possibility of simultaneous location decisions by households and firms was 
raised as early as Vicki Been (1994).  This problem is pernicious, however, and pervades 
the literature.  Few have tried to model both decisions simultaneously.  For example, Hite 
(2000, Chapter 16 of this volume) looks at endogenous location choices of households, 
given fixed locations for environmental harms. She estimates a "random utility model" of 
location choices using 2,889 house sales with data on house characteristics, neighborhood 
characteristics, and distance to any of the four landfill sites around Columbus Ohio.  With 
full information and no location constraints such as discrimination, then no household 
would envy another in the sense of preferring the other's consumption bundle.  Using the 
model, she can calculate the probability that a household in one area with estimated 
preferences would really prefer to live in a different area.  If so, it could indicate 
discrimination.  She finds some evidence for environmental discrimination against 
African American households, but not against poor households.  Note that this potential 
discrimination would be discrimination in housing markets.  Since polluter locations are 
fixed, she does not look at discrimination in location decisions of firms.
 10  
  A further step towards dealing with the simultaneous location decisions by both 
firms and households is taken by Gray and Shadbegian (2004, Chapter 17).  They look at 
many determinants of air and water pollution and of enforcement actions at 409 pulp and 
paper mills from 1985 to 1997, including local demographic variables.  They recognize 
potential for reverse causation, however, since poor households could move into dirty 
neighborhoods for cheaper housing, and those with small children or elderly who are 
sensitive to pollution could move out. Thus, demographics near the plant are endogenous, 
and OLS regressions are biased.  They do not model household location decisions 
directly along with polluter location decisions, because the sample of plants is quite old.  
Instead, they run a regression of those endogenous local characteristics on a set of 
instruments, namely, the demographic characteristics of people living 50-100 miles away 
from the polluting plant. The idea is that these "spatially lagged" variables are highly 
correlated with local characteristics, but not influenced by effects of pollution from that 
plant, since pollution effects decline with distance. Using predicted local characteristics 
in place of actual local characteristics, they find that plants in poor neighborhoods emit 
more pollution, and those near kids or elderly emit less, but surprisingly, they find that 
plants in nonwhite neighborhoods also emit less pollution.  
  Most of this introduction is concerned with distributional effects across income 
groups, although this section has touched on effects across ethnic groups.  However, 
effects of environmental policy could be measured across groups defined by age, health 
status, region, or other breakdown.  Also, most of these studies employ various "revealed 
preference" data on willingness to pay (WTP) for a cleaner environment, such as through 
house prices.  In contrast, Alberini, Cropper, Krupnick, and Simon (2004, Chapter 18 of 
this volume) use surveys of "stated preferences" to look at WTP by different groups 
defined by age and health status.   
When the U.S. EPA (1999) looks at all costs and benefits of the Clean Air Act, 
they find the huge majority of benefits in the form of mortality reductions.  Who benefits 
                                                 
10 In a 2002 working paper, Ann Wolverton looks directly at plant location decisions and the community 
characteristics at the time the plant was originally sited.  She finds that the polluting plants in her sample 
did not locate disproportionately in minority neighborhoods.   -12-
from these mortality reductions?  Theoretical predictions are ambiguous.  Older or less 
healthy individuals have higher baseline mortality risk, and thus might be willing to pay 
more for a reduction in the risk of dying this year.  If so, environmental policy benefits 
the elderly and infirm.  On the other hand, they may have fewer years to live, and for that 
reason be willing to pay less for a reduction in the risk of dying this year.   Following 
established contingent valuation techniques, Alberini et al survey 930 Canadians and 
1200 Americans.
11  They find an overall Value of a Statistical Life (VSL) between $1.5 
and $4.8 million, somewhat less than the $6 million figure used by the EPA.   Although 
no statistically significant age effect is found in the U.S., the WTP falls significantly after 
age 70 in Canada.  The WTP rises with income in both samples, but significantly only in 
the U.S.  The value of risk reductions is significantly higher in both samples for those 
with family history of chronic heart or lung disease and for those recently admitted to a 
hospital for a heart or lung condition. 
Cameron and McConnaha (2006, Chapter 19) do not provide direct evidence on 
distributional effects of environmental policy, but they shed light on whether polluters 
locate in certain types of neighborhoods, whether people "come to the nuisance", or both.  
They look simply at migrations between the four census measurements over three 
decades (1970-2000), in response to environmental hazards and subsequent cleanups.  
The units of observation are census tracts within a 12-mile radius around each of four 
contaminated Superfund sites.  For the vicinity around each site, they estimate changes in 
the distance profile over time for the concentration of each of 22 household 
characteristics (using 88 different regressions).  For ten of the 22 characteristics, they find 
statistically significant changes in its relative concentration near the site over time (as 
these sites are identified and then cleaned up).  In the first decade after the contamination 
is announced, they find declines in the prevalence of "children under six" and "married 
couples with children", and they find increases in seniors, married couples without 
children, female-headed households without children, and non-family households.  In 
many cases, those migrations are reversed in the decade after a clean up is complete.  
Results on nonwhites differ across their four sites. 
The implication here is not just that families with children might well be burdened 
by pollution, but that they move away!  Other less-sensitive groups take their place.  This 
evidence makes it very difficult, in the next generation of literature, for researchers to 
take neighborhood characteristics as exogenous – as done by some earlier researchers.  
Other evidence reviewed above makes it equally difficult to take pollution levels as 
exogenous.  The simultaneity of household and polluter location choices continues to be 
one of the greatest challenges to economic research in this area. 
 
V. Effects via Land Prices 
 
   The gains and losses each period that are depicted in Figure 1 can be capitalized 
into asset prices.  Section III above discussed how the annual flow of "scarcity rents" 
(area  A+B) is capitalized into corporate stock prices, and this section discusses how the 
"benefits from environmental protection" (area C+D+E) are capitalized into land prices.  
If a policy provides cleaner air to a particular neighborhood, then the entire present value 
                                                 
11 The protocol includes much information on changes to risk, and yes-or-no dichotomous choice questions 
about whether the respondent would be willing to purchase that reduction in risk for a particular price 
(chosen randomly from one of four predetermined values).  Additional questions relate to income and 
health status, followed by debriefing questions to check the respondent's comprehension.     -13-
of those gains can be captured by whoever owns a house site at the time of the change.
12  
These individuals who gain may not be the same as those who breathe the cleaner air. 
Similarly, if certain households migrate into an area near a contaminated Superfund site 
to take advantage of cheaper housing, then the clean up of that site does not compensate 
those who suffered the losses from the environmental hazard. 
  Since at least Ridker and Henning (1967), economists have estimated house price 
as a hedonic function of house and neighborhood characteristics such as air quality, water 
quality, or distance from a toxic waste site.  The coefficient on such a variable indicates 
the market's willingness to pay for improvement in that environmental measure.
13  This 
method will not easily reveal the distributional effects of all pollution, or all abatement 
policies, but it can be used to calculate the distribution of gains from a marginal policy to 
abate.  Ted Gayer (2000, Chapter 20 of this volume) uses 6,562 house sales and GIS data 
to calculate distance to each Superfund site around Grand Rapids Michigan.  However, 
the environmental risk itself may be determined in part by house prices, if polluters are 
more likely to locate near inexpensive homes.  If so, then the usual OLS regression of 
house price on house and neighborhood characteristics and this environmental risk yields 
biased coefficients.  Gayer finds that this variable is indeed endogenous, and he corrects 
for it using a first stage regression of that risk on exogenous instrumental variables.  
Results indicate that welfare gains of risk reduction would be greater for neighborhoods 
with high income and education, and lower for with more nonwhites. 
  This correction for endogeneity is an improvement.  Still, however, Gayer's 
exogenous instruments include the neighborhood's socioeconomic variables as well as 
measures of potential for collective action.  Firm location or pollution decisions can help 
affect environmental risks and house prices simultaneously in his model, but household 
characteristics are exogenous.  Thus this research does not yet solve the chicken and egg 
problem regarding whether polluting firms locate in low-income and minority 
neighborhoods, or poor families arrive later to take advantage of low house prices. 
Using data from 1989-91 in Southern California, Sieg, Smith, Banzhaf and Walsh 
(2004, Chapter 21 of this volume) estimate the parameters of a structural model that can 
be used to calculate the welfare effects of large air quality improvements, such as those 
from 1990 to 1995 that reduced ozone from 3% to 33% across different neighborhoods.  
They incorporate how preference heterogeneity leads some households to respond to 
changes in local amenities by moving, which induces changes in house prices, which 
might induce further moves until a new equilibrium is attained.  The paper shows that the 
general equilibrium calculation of value accounting for these house price changes is quite 
different from the partial equilibrium value based on fixed house prices.  In the results for 
particular locations, the two measures differ much more than on average and may have 
different signs.  Even when a poor location experiences some improvement, house price 
increases can offset that benefit.  In one location where ozone fell by 24%, house prices 
rise nearly 11%.  Poor families may lose, while landlords gain.  
  While local or regional pollutants may be capitalized into residential land prices, 
global effects can be capitalized into other land prices.  Mendelsohn, Nordhaus and Shaw 
(1994) regress agricultural land prices on soil attributes and other local characteristics 
including temperature, precipitation, and other climate variables.  The use of a cross 
section implies that all farmers have already adapted to their climate.  This Ricardian 
                                                 
12 That statement is strictly true only with inelastic supply of land.  The price change is moderated if supply 
is elastic, such as by the conversion of more fringe land into residential use.   
13 An excellent recent example of hedonic house price estimation is Chay and Greenstone (2005).  Their 
estimates could be used to study distributional effects, but they focus mostly on aggregate estimates 
correcting for omitted variable bias and self selection issues.    -14-
method can be used to calculate the long run gain or loss to each location from climate 
change.  A few such studies have been undertaken for developing countries. 
Mendelsohn, Dinar, and Williams (2006, Chapter 22 of this volume) use such 
results to calibrate response functions for each sector of each country.  They then employ 
three different climate models to predict temperature and precipitation for a grid of points 
on the globe in the year 2100, and they calculate the gain or loss to each country.  They 
find that poor countries suffer most of the damages from global warming.  The reason is 
not that those countries will experience more dramatic climate change than other 
countries; indeed, results are similar when merely assuming that all experience the same 
changes.  Rather, poor countries suffer the most damage because they are already in 
warmer locations.  Poor countries near the equator become even warmer and less 
productive, while richer countries in cool climates become warmer and more productive. 
  This paper is also a good example of the multiple ways to define distributional 
effects of environmental policy: across different countries as well as within a country 
between groups defined by income, age, or ethnicity. 
 
VI. Conclusion: Costs of Transition and Remaining Issues 
 
  This introduction has reviewed studies of the effects of environmental policy on 
consumers and on producers, through scarcity rents, and benefits of protection.  Other 
effects of environmental policy are not as well studied in available literature, however, 
such adjustment costs and other transition costs.  In Figure 1, area F represents the value 
of inputs no longer employed in this industry.  They are often assumed to be re-employed 
elsewhere, with no loss.  Yet a change in environmental policy can be very disruptive, 
especially for a local economy highly dependent on the resource just protected.  Logging 
or mining is often a predominant occupation in a town that can be virtually annihilated by 
environmental protection.  Those individuals may acquire a great deal of industry-
specific human capital, the value of which is lost by the shrinking of that industry.  This 
human capitalization effect can imply a much larger percentage loss for individuals than 
other asset price capitalization effects of environmental policy discussed above.  
     The first section above describes two challenges of Baumol and Oates (1988), 
so we now turn to judge progress in subsequent literature.  First, they challenge 
economists to deal more seriously with distributional effects of environmental policy.  
While the prior literature does indeed emphasize effects on economic efficiency, the 
collection of papers in this volume is ample evidence that economists are beginning to 
study distributional effects.  Yet much remains to be done.  
The second challenge of Baumol and Oates (1988) is to determine whether energy 
or environmental policy is really as regressive as it appears, and if so, what can be done 
about it.  Papers in this volume show that environmental protection does likely raise the 
price of goods such as electricity and transportation that constitute high fractions of low-
income budgets.  In addition, pollution permits handed out to firms bestow scarcity rents 
on the well-off individuals who own those firms.  Yet some of the papers in this volume 
show how rebates to low-income households can offset those regressive effects and allow 
for environmental protection without adverse distributional consequences.  This point 
makes it important to use emissions taxes or the auction of permits, to raise revenue 
enough to cover the cost of those rebates. 
Other papers in this volume estimate whether high income individuals get more 
benefits from environmental protection, because of higher willingness to pay.  Results are 
mixed.  Certainly high income families have more ability to pay, and thus may have 
higher demand for recreation and other environmental amenities, but the actual valuation   -15-
by different groups depends on what amenity is being valued.  Thus, environmental 
policies can be designed to provide sufficient protection to low-income neighborhoods.  
Some of the most pernicious effects of environmental policy, however, are the 
capitalization effects that provide windfall gains and losses.  Those who own land or 
corporate stock at the time of environmental damage suffer a capital loss, and they may 
sell that asset before the abatement policy is implemented.  It then provides gains to 
others who did not suffer the loss.  Capitalization effects also apply to human capital, 
with even greater proportional gains and losses to individuals.  These effects also are a 
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